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Abstract
This research investigates the development of analogy: in
particular, we wish to study the development of systematicity in
analogy. Systematicity refers to the mapping of systems of
mutually constraining relations, such as causal chains or chains
of implication. A preference for systematic mappings is a
central aspect of analogical processing in adults (Gentner, 1980,
1983). This research asks two questions: (a) does systematicity
make analogical mapping easier; and (b) if so, when
developmentally do children become able to utilize systematicity.
Children aged 5-7 and 8-10 acted out stories with toy
characters. Then they were asked to act out the same stories
with new characters. Two variables were manipulated:
systematicity, or the degree of explicit causal structure in the
original stories, and the transparency of the object-mappings.
Transparency was manipulated by varying the similarity between
the original characters and the corresponding new characters; it
was included in order to vary the difficulty of the transfer
task. If children can utilize systematicity, then their transfer
accuracy should be greater for systematic stories.
The results show (a) as expected, transparency strongly
influenced transfer accuracy: for both age groups, transfer
accuracy dropped sharply as the object correspondences became
less transparent; (b) for the older group, there was also a
strong effect of systematicity and an interaction between the two
variables. Given a systematic story, nine-year-olds could
transfer it accurately regardless of the transparency of the
object correspondences.
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Systematicity and Surface Similarity
in the Development of Analogy
Analogy is a central process in learning and discovery. For
example, Sadi Carnot's great work on the principles of heat is
pervaded by an analogy between heat and water: the 'fall' of
heat from high temperature to low temperature is compared to the
fall of water from high elevation to low elevation. Just as
Carnot used this analogy to think through the mechanical action
of heat, so a student learning water can use the same analogy to
come to understand ideas like "The power released when heat flows
between two bodies varies with the difference in temperature
between them" (Buckley, 1979). But notice that to make this
analogy useful the learner must focus on certain kinds of matches
between the two domains (e.g., Clement, 1981, 1982; Collins &
Gentner, in press; Forbus & Gentner, 1986; Kempton, in press;
VanLehn & Brown, 1980). A learner who interpreted the analogy to
mean that heat is wet or transparent like water might be worse
off with the analogy than without it. The power of an analogy in
learning is in the system of relations that can be mapped.
Focus on systems of mutually constraining relations is a
central aspect of adult competence in processing analogy
(Gentner, 1980, 1983). Adults not only have the ability to map a
system of relations, but show a marked preference for such
mappings (Gentner & Landers, 1985). This bias towards mapping
systems seems to reflect a tacit preference for coherence and
mutual constraint in analogical mapping. This research asks two
questions: (a) does the presence of systematic relations make
analogical mapping easier; and (b) if so, when developmentally do
children become able to utilize this systematicity.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first give a brief
review of the literature on analogical development. Then we
present structure-mapping and the systematicity principle.
Finally, we describe our research tracing the development of
systematicity in analogy.
Development of Analogy
Since children are major consumers of education, it is
important to know what they do with instructional and
experiential analogies. Unfortunately there is a great deal of
evidence suggesting that young children do not use analogies in
the powerful systematic way that adults do. Experimental studies
show a marked developmental change in children's fluency at
interpreting metaphors. A four-year-old asked "Can a person be
sweet?" answers literally: e.g., "Not unless he was made out of
chocolate" (Asch & Nerlove, 1960). Similarly, young children are
poor at matching sentences with metaphorically related pictures
(Dent, 1984; Kogan, 1975) and at choosing appropriate
metaphorical completions for sentences (Gardner, Kircher, Winner,
& Perkins, 1975). Young children tend to produce and select
attributional interpretations to nonliteral comparisons. This
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pattern contrasts sharply with the adult preference for
relational interpretations. For example, given the comparison "A
cloud is like a sponge," five-year-olds produce interpretations
like "Both are round and fluffy." Adults produce relational
interpretations: e.g., "Both can hold water for some time and
then later give it back" (Gentner, 1980; Gentner & Block, 1983;
Gentner & Stuart, 1983). Further, adults rate analogical
comparisons as more apt when they can find relational
interpretations than when they can find only attributional
interpretations. Children show no such preferences; they are
equally happy with relational and attributional interpretations
(Gentner, 1986; Gentner & Landers, 1985). These and many other
experimental results seem to indicate that the ability to perform
figurative comparisons develops gradually and late (Inhelder &
Piaget, 1958).
However, it has been pointed out that a number of factors
enter into the assessment of metaphoric and analogical ability
(Gentner, 1977; Reynolds & Ortony, 1980; Vosniadou, 1985). Young
children differ from older children in their command of the
vocabulary, in their knowledge of the domains, and in their
pragmatic understanding of when non-literal interpretations are
permissible. This means that in many situations, especially with
verbal interpretation tasks, there is danger of underestimating
the young child's metaphorical ability and of conflating other
developmental trends with the development of true analogical
ability.
In order to isolate development of analogy from other
developmental trends, we must first delineate the essential
processes that define analogy and metaphor. Then we can
determine the course of development of analogy. In particular,
we can ask when in development children become able to take
advantage of systematicity.
Structure-mapping and Systematicity
The theoretical framework for this research is the
structure-mapping theory of analogy (Gentner, 1980, 1982, 1983;
Gentner & Gentner, 1983). This theory describes the set of
implicit rules by which people interpret analogy and similarity.
An analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base)
into another (the target), according to the following rules. 1
Objects in the base are placed in correspondence with objects in
the target:
M: b. -- > t.
1 1
Predicates are mapped from the base to the
the following mapping rules:
(1) Attributes of objects are dropped:
e.g., [RED (bi)] -- > [RED
(2) Relations between objects in the base
across:
target according to
(t )].
tend to be mapped
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(3) The particular relations mapped are determined by
systematicity, as defined by the existence of higher-order
constraining relations which can themselves be mapped:
e.g., CAUSE [PUSH(bi, b.), COLLIDE (b , bk)] ->
CAUSE [PUSH(ti, t.), COLLIDE (t., tk)]
Figure 1 shows an example analogy: the Rutherford analogy
between the solar system and the hydrogen atom. Let us ask what
this analogy conveys to the person hearing it for the first time.
Assuming that the person has the prior knowledge about the solar
system shown in the top network, the person must
- set up the object correspondences between the two domains:
sun -- > nucleus and planet -- > electron.
- discard object attributes, such as YELLOW (sun).
- map base relations such as MORE MASSIVE THAN (sun, planet)
to the corresponding objects in the target domain.
- observe systematicity: i.e., discard isolated relations,
such as HOTTER THAN (sun, planet), and keep relations such
as MORE MASSIVE THAN that are governed by higher-order
constraining relations which can themselves be mapped.
Here, the higher-order system is
e.g., IMPLIES [MORE-MASSIVE-THAN (sun, planet),
REVOLVE-AROUND (planet, sun)].
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Systematicity. Part of our understanding about analogy is
that it conveys a system of connected knowledge, not a mere
assortment of independent facts. The systematicity principle is
included for formalize this tacit preference for coherence and
deductive power in analogy. The systematicity principle states
that a base predicate that belongs to a mappable system of
mutually interconnecting relations is more likely to be imported
into the target than is an isolated predicate. A system of
relations refers to an interconnected predicate structure in
which higher-order predicates enforce constraints among lower-
order predicates. 2
The systematicity principle requires a mappable relational
chain. If the predicates, and especially the higher-order
relations, of the base chain are not valid in the target, then
another chain must be selected. Thus, a relational chain--such
as a causal chain--in the base that matches a relational chain in
the target constitutes good support for its members. Winston
(1982) gives an insightful demonstration of the need for such
importance-dominated matching.
By promoting deep relational chains, the systematicity
principle operates to promote predicates that participate in
causal chains and in other constraint relations. It is an
essentially syntactic mechanism that guarantees that the set of
candidate mappings will be as interesting--in the sense that a
Development of Analogy
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mutually interconnected system of predicates is interesting--as
the knowledge base allows.
Ease of mapping. Our discussion so far has been couched in
terms of the implicit standards for a good analogical mapping.
Empirical studies have borne out the prediction that
systematicity is one of the implicit rules for a good analogical
mapping. Adults focus on shared systematic relational structure
in interpreting analogy. They tend to include relations and omit
attributes in their interpretations of analogy, and they judge
analogies as more apt if they share systematic relational
structure (Gentner, 1980; Gentner & Block, 1983; Gentner &
Landers, 1985; Gentner & Stuart, 1983). From this we can
conclude that systematicity is a desideratum in analogy; it is
one of the criteria by which an interpretation is devised and by
which the analogy itself is judged.
But we want to go beyond the prior evidence here to suggest
that systematicity may also play an active role in guiding the
on-line mapping process. We conjecture that the presence of
higher-order constraints helps guide the mapping of lower-order
relations and provides a check on the correctness of the mapping.
An error made in mapping a particular relation from base to
target is more likely to be detected quickly if there is a
higher-order relation which relates that lower-order relation to
other knowledge.
To see how this could work, imagine a learner who hears the
Rutherford analogy, "The atom is like the solar system," for the
first time. Let us assume that the learner knows something about
the solar system and little or nothing about the structure of the
atom, and must map information from his model of the solar
system. We contrast the case in which the learner has a
systematic representation of the solar system with that in which
he does not. In each case, we will assume the learner makes one
mistake in mapping predicates from base to target. Then we will
contrast the two cases--the systematic knowledge case and the
nonsystematic knowledge case--to show how systematic knowledge
enables the learner to repair mapping errors.
Figure 2 shows two representations of the solar system/atom
analogy: a systematic representation (Figure 2a) and a
nonsystematic representation (Figure 2b).
---------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here.
---------------------------
Suppose that the learner momentarily switches the objects
when mapping the MORE MASSIVE THAN predicate and ends up with
MORE MASSIVE THAN (electron, nucleus).
At this point the learner is in danger of ending with a garbled
and inaccurate notion of the structure of the atom. Now let us
take the two cases in turn.
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Systematic knowledge case. For the learner who has a
systematic model of the base domain, there is a higher-order
causal relation that can be mapped from base to target. This
gives the learner a way of spotting the error. For at this point
he has the following derived propositions in the target:
1. MORE MASSIVE THAN (electron, nucleus)
2. REVOLVE AROUND (electron, nucleus) (We assume both
learners have mapped this lower-order relation correctly.)
3. CAUSE [MORE MASSIVE THAN (electron, nucleus),
REVOLVE AROUND (electron, nucleus)]
The last assertion is the causal chain that the learner
derives by plugging in his (partly erroneous) lower-order
mappings to the higher-order CAUSE relation. This chain can be
compared to the similar causal statement that the learner knows
from the base domain:
- CAUSE [MORE MASSIVE THAN (sun, planet),
REVOLVE AROUND (planet, sun)]
Comparing these two chains, the learner can see an
inconsistency. In the base domain, the less massive object
revolves; in the target, the more massive object revolves. One
way to resolve the inconsistency is to recheck the object
mappings, giving the learner an opportunity to correct his error.
Thus systematic knowledge of the base domain should allow the
learner to detect and repair an incorrect local mapping.
Nonsystematic knowledge case. The learner's derived
representation of the target domain has only the two lower-order
relations:
1. MORE MASSIVE THAN (electron, nucleus)
2. REVOLVE AROUND (electron, nucleus)
There is nothing to alert him to an error in mapping these
relations. Without systematic structure to map from the base
domain, the learner simply has a disconnected set of low-order
predicates. Thus he is unlikely to notice and repair a mapping
error.
Based on this reasoning, we conjecture that the presence of
systematic relational structure should provide an on-line check
on the correctness of the individual lower-order predicate
mappings. Thus, systematicity should increase the transfer
accuracy of an analogical mapping. Another factor that should be
important during the on-line mapping process is the transparency
of the object-correspondences. Transparency is defined as the
ease of determining the object correspondences and predicate
mappings for an analogy or similarity match. Transparency is
high when surface similarity correlates well with structural
similarity. There is evidence that transfer accuracy is greater
for high-transparency analogies (Reed, 1985; Ross, 1986). We
predict that transparency will have a strong effect on transfer
accuracy. To the degree that it is easy to determine how the
objects in the base correspond with the objects in the target,
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the transfer of predicate structure from base to target should be
easier.
This line of reasoning leads us to three predictions
concerning analogical mapping:
1. Transparent object-correspondences promote accurate
mapping.
2. Systematic knowledge of the base domain leads to more
accurate analogical mapping.
3. The effect of systematicity will be stronger the more
difficult (the less transparent) the analogical mapping.
The Development of Systematicity
In this research, we investigated the development of
systematicity in analogical mapping. We wished to discover when
children become able to benefit from the presence of a system of
mutually constraining relations in carrying out an analogy. To
do this, we used a technique we called cross-mapping to vary the
transparency of a set of analogical mappings. Then we gave
children either systematic or nonsystematic base scenarios to
map, as described below. The question was whether the degree of
systematicity would affect children's ability to perform
analogical transfer. If children's accuracy is improved by the
presence of systematically connected knowledge structures, this
is evidence that they can appreciate systematicity, whether or
not they are able to articulate this appreciation explicitly.
Our method was designed to avoid the confoundings inherent in
15
requiring a verbal interpretation. The children were simply
asked to act out stories using toy dolls and animals. The
analogical step was that the children had to transfer a story
plot from one set of characters to another. An important aspect
of the methodology is that we do not require our subjects to
articulate the higher-order information. Children are compared
only in their accuracy at acting out the low-order event
predicates, which are identical in systematic and nonsystematic
stories. Thus any developmental differences in the effects of
systematicity here are likely to reflect true cognitive
differences, and not merely differences in facility with
language.
In order to fully test the effects of systematicity, we
wanted to include a wide range of mapping difficulty. This
brings us to the second theoretical question addressed in the
study: the effects of varying the transparency of the object
correspondence between base and target. To achieve this
variation, we varied the surface similarity between the
characters and the test characters. There were three levels of
transparency: (a) high transparency--test characters look highly
similar to corresponding original characters; (b) moderate
transparency--test characters look quite different from
corresponding original characters; and (c) low transparency--test
characters look similar to non-corresponding original characters
(the cross-mapped case). The cross-mapped case is predicted to
Development of Analogy
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be very difficult, because the object similarities between base
and target are deliberately misleading. A given test character
looks like one of the original characters, but plays a different
role in the story. An example will help make the three
transparency conditions clear. Suppose that in the original
story the hero was a chipmunk, the hero's friend was a robin and
the villain was a horse. Then the roles in the three kinds of
mapping conditions might be
ORIGINAL HIGH MEDIUM LOW
HERO chipmunk squirrel elephant zebra
FRIEND robin bluebird shark squirrel
VILLAIN horse zebra cricket bluebird
The design included age and systematicity as between-
subjects variables and transparency as a within-subjects
variable. We predicted that children's accuracy in enacting the
second story would be greatest in the high-transparency mapping
condition and lowest in the low-transparency cross-mapped
condition, where the natural object mappings had to be resisted.
Besides this prediction, there were three questions of interest:
- whether transfer accuracy would be higher for systematic
stories than for nonsystematic stories
- if so, when such systematicity effects would show up
developmentally
- whether systematicity would interact with mapping
difficulty.
Development of Analogy
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This last question is particularly interesting from our
theoretical perspective. For if the presence of systematic
higher-order relations helps the child preserve the relational
structure she is trying to map, then the more difficult the
mapping the greater the potential benefit of systematicity.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 72 children, 36 four- to six-year-olds and
36 eight- to ten-year-olds, recruited from schools and preschools
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. They were randomly assigned to
either the systematic or the nonsystematic condition.
Approximately equal numbers of males and females were included
within each of the two experimental conditions, within each age
group.
Materials
Stories. Nine short stories were constructed, each
involving three characters and depicting a series of actions
which led to a final outcome. There were two versions of each
story: systematic and nonsystematic. The structure of the
stories was as follows: (a) an introductory section, which
introduced the characters; (b) an event sequence, with an
outcome; (c) a moral (in systematic versions only). For each
story, the event sequence was a set of 10 to 15 sentences
depicting a series of events and an outcome. This section was
identical in the systematic and nonsystematic story types. The
Development of AnalogyDevelopment of Analogy
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story types differed only in their introductory sections and in
whether they contained a moral. Table 1 shows sample stories.
Insert Table 1 about here.
For both kinds of stories, the introductory section was one
or two sentences long and contained (a) some descriptive
information about the protagonist (e.g., "There once was a very
handsome chipmunk.") and (b) some relation between the
protagonist and one of the other two characters (e.g., "The
chipmunk was friends with the cow."). The relation between the
characters was the same in the systematic and nonsystematic story
types. However, the information about the protagonist differed
between the two story types. In the systematic stories, the
description of the protagonist concerned a relevant habit or
relational trait (e.g., "The chipmunk was very jealous"). In the
nonsystematic stories the description attributed a neutral trait
(e.g., "The chipmunk was very good-looking."). For both
systematic and nonsystematic stories, the introductory sections
were designed to define the roles of the characters. This meant
that, to set up a transfer test, we could simply read the child
the introduction with the new character assignments; this
determined the rest of the story.
Aside from the difference in the introduction, the
systematic stories differed from the nonsystematic stories in
possessing a moral: a final sentence that expressed a moral and
linked the protagonist's initial character trait to the story
outcome (e.g., "The chipmunk realized that he shouldn't be so
jealous, because it is better to have more friends." No moral
was added to the nonsystematic stories. The systematic stories,
with a mean word length of 200 words, were somewhat longer than
the nonsystematic stories (with a mean word length of 170 words),
chiefly because of the presence of the moral. Half the children
received systematic stories; the other half, nonsystematic
stories.
Story-telling stimuli. Sixty-three toy dolls and animals
were used to depict the characters. Of these, there were 27
pairs of animals that were independently judged by three judges
to be 'similar-looking,' and nine animals that were judged to be
'different-looking' from one another and from any of the paired
animals. A small number of props were used to aid in the story-
telling. For each story, one or two rectangular, colored felt
pieces were used to mark key locations, such as a house or road.
For some stories, one or two additional toys, such as a wagon or
plastic food, were used as props.
Mapping conditions. For each target story, three further
stories were constructed using different sets of characters.
These three story types reflected three mapping conditions
corresponding to high, medium or low transparency:
19
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- S/S: Similar Characters / Similar Roles (High
Transparency)
- D: Different Characters / Similar Roles (Medium
Transparency)
- S/D: Similar Characters / Different Roles (Low
Transparency)
In the S/S condition, the test characters looked like the
characters in the original story, and they played the same role
as their counterparts in the original story. In the D condition,
the test characters bore no resemblance to any of the characters
in the original story. In the S/D condition, the test characters
resembled those in the original story, but were given different
roles from their look-alike counterparts in the original story.
This was predicted to be the most difficult mapping condition.
Table 2 shows the object mappings for all nine stories.
--------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here.
--------------------------
The mapping condition could have been varied by giving all
children the same base story and then varying the target story.
As Table 2 shows, we decided instead to vary the original base
story that the children heard. Thus, a child in the S/S
condition and a child in the S/D condition would receive
different original stories, but the same target story. This was
done in order to achieve strict comparability on the test phase.
Development of Analogy
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Since the child can receive help or extra practice when necessary
in acting out the original stories, any small differences in the
ease of comprehension of the original stories are less likely to
affect the overall results than would differences in the test
stories. Thus the base stories varied according to systematicity
(systematic or nonsystematic) and mapping condition (S/S, D, or
S/D), for a total of six kinds of base stories (see Table 2).
All children received three stories in each of the three
mapping conditions, for a total of nine stories. The assignment
of stories to mapping condition was counterbalanced across groups
of children. The mapping conditions (S/S, D and S/D) were
presented in three different orders, according to a Latin square
design. There were two orderings--one the reverse of the other--
for the stories themselves. Thus, children were divided into 12
groups according to their Systematicity Condition, Mapping Order
and Story Order. However, the essential experimental variables
were Age (2 levels, between), Systematicity (2 levels, between)
and Mapping Condition (3 levels, within).
Procedure
Children were read aloud the stories and asked to act them
out with toy animals. Once they had acted out a story, they were
asked to act out the same story again, only with new characters.
A practice session using a four-line story about two characters
was used to acquaint subjects with their task. During the
practice session, children were encouraged to tell the story and
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speak the dialogue. The experimenter demonstrated the two-fold
task for the child if necessary. The experiment began once a
child demonstrated the ability to perform the transfer task
successfully without help. The experimental procedure was the
same for each story and was divided into two parts: the Story
Phase and the Test Phase.
Story phase. The experimenter began each story by
introducing the three story characters (e.g., 'Here is the
moose.'). The experimenter made sure that the child could
correctly name the toys before proceeding. With the story
characters in view, the child was then instructed to listen
carefully to the story. After the experimenter finished reading
the story aloud, props, including location markers, were
introduced: e.g., the 'wheelbarrow' or the 'lake.' Some
individual variation in the use of props was allowed, as long as
the child used each prop consistently. The child then acted out
the story, using the characters and props. If the child made
omissions or errors, the experimenter corrected them and asked
the child to again act out the story. Once the child
demonstrated the ability to act out the original story correctly
without help, the Test Phase began.
Test phase. The experimenter then asked the subject to act
out the same story again, but with three new characters. The
three original story characters were removed from view and the
new test characters were introduced: e.g., 'This is the
Development of Analogy
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squirrel.' Location markers, such as the 'lake,' were left in
the same position, and props were gathered and set before the
subject to use. The child was then instructed to listen
carefully to the beginning of the story with the names of the new
characters. The experimenter read aloud the introductory section
and repeated it if desired. Then the child was told to act out
the rest of the story.
The stories were designed so that the introductory section
set the roles of the characters in such a way as to determine the
rest of the story for a child who had performed the character-
mapping correctly. During the test phase, the experimenter did
not provide the subject with any information regarding mapping
assignments, omissions, or errors. However, the experimenter
could give neutral prompts, such as "What happened next?" or "Who
is doing that?" In addition, the experimenter would repeat the
correct name(s) of the character(s) or the introductory section
on request.
The Story and Test Phases were carried out in the same way
for each story. Children were given three stories in a test
session, with a two-minute distractor task of coloring or putting
together a puzzle between stories. Each child participated in
three test sessions, spaced at least a day apart.
Scoring. For each story, the sentences were grouped into
six core propositions representing the major events and the
outcome. The moral in the systematic stories constituted a
Development of Analogy
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seventh proposition that was scored separately. In scoring,
propositions were treated as wholes. If an error was committed
with respect to any one character or action contained in a
proposition, the proposition was considered incorrect. Thus, for
each subject there were six possible correct propositions per
story. The same six propositions were scored for systematic and
nonsystematic stories.
Three scoring procedures were used: Strict, Lenient and Key
Sentence scoring. However, since all gave the same results, we
describe only the strict scoring procedure. In the strict
scoring procedure, a proposition was scored as correct if the
child either verbally or nonverbally depicted each of its events
with the correct assignment of actors. Two types of errors were
scored: omissions and incorrect answers. A proposition was
scored as an omission if the subject verbally omitted any action
or character contained in that proposition AND failed to
adequately demonstrate the inclusion of the action or character
through nonverbal actions. A proposition was scored as incorrect
if any character or action contained in that proposition was
incorrectly identified AND the subject failed to correctly
identify the character or action in question through nonverbal
actions.
Results
The results are shown in Figure 3. These results show:
1. as predicted, object-mapping transparency had strong
effects on transfer accuracy for both age groups.
2. systematicity benefited only the older group.
3. the benefits of systematicity were strongest in the most
difficult mapping condition.
---------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here.
---------------------------
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed-measures analysis of variance of Age
(Between) X Systematicity (Between) X Mapping Condition (Within)
showed main effects of Age [F(1,68) = 14.93, _ < .001],
Systematicity [F(1,68) = 6.28, _p < .05], and Mapping Condition
[F(2,136) = 29.01, _p < .000001]. There was also the predicted
interaction between Systematicity and Mapping Condition [F(2,
136) = 3.89, _ < .05].
Although both Mapping Condition and Systematicity show main
effects, their developmental patterns differ. Mapping Condition
shows strong effects for both age groups. As predicted, the
children performed best with the easy S/S mapping, intermediate
with the D mapping, and worst with the misleading S/D mapping.
Planned comparisons confirmed that Mapping Condition had
significant effects on both age groups.
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In contrast, Systematicity showed significant effects only
in the older group. For the older children, performance was
significantly better on systematic stories [t(34) = 2.48, jp
< .011. This was not true for the younger children; they derived
no significant advantage from systematic plot structure [t(34) =
1.08, NS]. 4
The last prediction was that Systematicity should have its
greatest effects on the most difficult mappings (since these are
the mappings in which the children cannot rely on object
similarity to perform the transfer). This prediction was
confirmed by the Systematicity X Mapping Condition interaction
noted above. More to the point, planned comparisons within the
older group (the only group affected by Systematicity) confirmed
that Systematicity was significant only in the S/D condition.
Thus the presence of systematic relational structure created a
significant improvement only in the most difficult mapping
condition.
It might be wondered whether the systematicity advantage in
transfer was simply a memory phenomenon. We know that the degree
of structure and organization plays a role in how well material
can be remembered (e.g., Bower & Clark, 1969; Bransford &
Johnson, 1972; Mandler, 1967); perhaps the eight-year-olds were
simply better able to remember the systematic stories during the
mapping task. Then the systematicity advantage would tell us
nothing about mapping, but only reaffirm the superiority of
Development of Analogy
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organized structures in memory. There are three arguments
against the memory interpretation of the data. First, the
children were uniformly able to perform the original story
enactments--i.e., the enactments using the initial set of
characters. Since this, too, was a memory task, any difference
in memory for the original stories should have shown up here.
Recall that the transfer enactment is done immediately after the
initial story enactment, so there should be little opportunity
for forgetting. Second, the interaction between systematicity
and mapping condition discussed in the preceding paragraph shows
that the effects of systematicity were specific, rather than an
across-the-board advantage. Third, and most important, all
children regardless of systematicity condition performed nearly
perfectly on the high-transparency transfer task. When the
transfer mappings were easy, children could demonstrate nearly
perfect memory for the original story in both the systematic and
nonsystematic condition. Thus we conclude that the differences
in transfer accuracy are not due to differential forgetting but
arise during the mapping process itself.
These results suggest that systematicity indeed plays a role
in the mapping process: that children, at least by the age of
eight, can use higher-order constraints to help keep the lower-
order predicates straight. We found informal support for this
claim in the self-corrections that the older children
occasionally made. A child would begin to make an error, acting
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out an event with the wrong character, and then stop herself with
a remark like "No, wait, it's the greedy one who got stuck in the
well, because he ate too much." These children, then, used
higher-order relations to check the correctness of lower-order
predicates during the mapping.
Discussion
In this research, we found effects of both systematicity and
transparency on the accuracy of children's analogical mappings.
These results have implications both for theories of analogical
processing and for accounts of the development of analogy and
metaphor. We begin by discussing the implications for theories
of analogy.
Systematicity in Analogical Mapping
The principle of systematicity is becoming increasingly
prominent in computational approaches to analogy (e.g., Burstein,
1983; Carbonell, 1983; Gentner, 1980, 1982, 1983; Gentner &
Gentner, 1983; Rumelhart & Norman, 1981; Winston, 1980, 1982).
Although accounts vary in detail, it is generally supposed that
the presence of some kind of common higher-order constraining
structure is an important determinant of the utility of an
analogy for learning and transfer. However, there has been
little evidence about how systematicity enters into the
analogical process. Is it simply a passive desideratum, which
the learner checks after interpreting an analogy to decide which
interpretation to choose and to determine how good the analogy
is? This limited view of systematicity is contradicted by the
present research. Our results show that systematicity enters
into the mapping process itself.
In this work we go beyond structure-mapping as a competence
theory--a theory of how people think an analogy should be
mapped--and consider its implications as a performance theory.
We ask what makes an analogy easy to process; and in particular
whether systematicity plays a role in making analogical mapping
easier. According to structure-mapping theory, once the base and
target domains have been accessed, the mapping process involves
setting up object-correspondences and carrying across predicates.
This suggests that at least two factors should enter into the
difficulty of the mapping process. The first is the transparency
of the object-correspondences: the more similar the
corresponding objects in base and target, the easier it should be
to keep the mapping straight, which here was manipulated by
varying the similarity among corresponding objects of base and
target. The second factor is the sturdiness of the predicate
structure that is to be mapped from base to target. This is
where systematicity enters in. The presence of constraining
higher-order relations that govern the lower-order predicates
both guides the on-line mapping of lower-order predicates and
provides the learner with checks on the correctness of the
mapping. Indeed, we saw children correct their enactments when
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they remembered higher-order information that predicted a
different event.
The theory predicts that both systematicity and transparency
should facilitate analogical mapping. 5 Both these claims were
verified for the eight-year-olds. We believe the same pattern of
results will hold for adults. Preliminary results using an adult
version of the same paradigm indicate that adults take longer to
retell the story in the most difficult mapping condition--the
cross-mapping case with a nonsystematic base story--than they do
in the more natural conditions.
Developmental Implications and Further Questions
Two developmental questions were posed here:
1. Are there developmental differences in the effects of
difficult object correspondences in analogical mapping?
2. Do children change in their ability to profit from
systematic relational structure in dealing with those
difficult correspondences?
One useful aspect of this methodology for studying development is
that it allows an indirect measure of the child's ability to use
systematicity. Research on development of metaphor has shown
repeatedly that children do not articulate their interpretation
of metaphors in the same manner as adults (Gardner, Kircher,
Winner & Perkins, 1975; Gentner & Stuart, 1983; Reynolds &
Ortony, 1980; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Winner, Rosenstiel &
Gardner, 1976). However, we cannot therefore infer that children
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are intellectually unable to perform metaphorical and analogical
transfer (cf. Brown & Campione, 1985; Carey, 1984; Winner, Engel
& Gardner, 1980). There is some evidence that children can
perform analogical mappings without necessarily being able to
articulate all the predicates that they are mapping (Crisafi &
Brown, 1983; Gardner, 1974; Gentner, 1977; Holyoak, Juin, &
Billman, in press); see Vosniadou (1985) for a review of this
issue. In the present methodology, children simply acted out
stories with a new set of characters. Thus, although they were
not required to verbalize the relational structure that they were
carrying across, their ability to make the transfer was clear
from the accuracy of their reenactment. Given that the child can
act out the original story (which was in all cases true), we
found:
1. children of both ages were affected by the transparency
of the object mappings.
2. systematicity benefited the older children.
3. systematicity had its greatest effect when the object
mappings were most difficult.
The transparency of the object-mapping affects both younger and
older children. Object similarity between base and target may
well be important in determining the ease of analogical
processing at all levels of development. The work of Ross (1984,
1986) and Reed (1985) suggests that even adults are greatly
influenced by the degree of surface similarity between potential
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analogs in learning and problem-solving tasks. In developmental
research on transfer tasks, the reliance of young children on
surface information is well-established (Keil & Batterman, 1984;
Kemler, 1983; Shepp, 1978; Smith & Kemler, 1977). Research by
DeLoache (1984) provides a particularly striking demonstration of
young children's reliance on surface similarity in transferring
knowledge. She tested children of 2 1/2 to 3 years of age in a
transfer-search task: an object is hidden in one space--for
example, a room--and the child must find a like object in a
similar space--for example, another room or a smaller scale model
of the original room. She finds that the children's performance
is extremely sensitive to surface similarity between the original
space and the search space. Our results are compatible with
DeLoache's findings in suggesting that transparency may be
developmentally among the earliest determinants of ease of
analogical mapping.
Systematicity, on the other hand, may make a somewhat later
developmental appearance. In our research, systematicity effects
were clearly present among the eight-year-olds, but not among the
younger children. However, our conclusions here must be
tentative; it is possible that with more sensitive methodology or
different materials we could find systematicity effects earlier
in development. Moreover, if indeed young children are deficient
in their ability to benefit from systematicity, there are at
least two different extreme interpretations, one based on
developmental increases in intellectual competence and other
based on acquisition of knowledge. The competence interpretation
is that younger children lack the processing ability to map whole
systems of relations. Their failure to use systematicity
reflects a developmental limitation in their basic competence.
The knowledge-based interpretation is that the younger children
had insufficient familiarity with the higher-order relations used
here. Thus even if they were intellectually able to use
systematicity in mapping, they were not in position to
demonstrate that ability. By this account, the difference
between younger and older children found here is a novice-expert
shift in the sense of Chi, Glaser and Reese (1982) or Larkin
(1983). From what we know so far, either account or a
combination could be correct.
To recapitulate, in this research we found that both younger
and older children did better when the object correspondences
were highly transparent. Only the older children benefited by
systematicity. In view of the centrality of systematicity in
analogical transfer, this developmental trend is important
whether it is a knowledge-based or a competence-based phenomenon.
The results of this study help us to delineate the subcomponents
of the mapping process and to chart their developmental course.
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Footnotes
Besides analogy, other kinds of similarity can be
characterized by the distribution of relational and attributional
predicates that are mapped. In analogy, only relational
predicates are mapped. In literal similarity, both relational
predicates and object-attributes are mapped. In mere-appearance
matches, it is chiefly object-attributes that are mapped.
2 The order of a relation is determined by the order of its
arguments. A first-order relation is one that takes objects as
its arguments. A second-order relation has at least one first-
order relation among its arguments. An nth order relation has at
least one (n - l)th order argument.
3 A relational chain can also provide support--particularly
in cases where little or nothing is known about the target
domain--if it merely generates no contradictions in the target.
It should be noted that there was no significant Age X
Systematicity interaction in the overall analysis of variance.
Therefore it is possible that systematicity benefited both
groups, but that only in the older group did the effects reach
significance.
5 Note that, although both systematicity and transparency are
postulated to make analogical mapping easier, only systematicity
enters into the perceived soundness of an analogy. Indeed, if
the object similarity becomes too high, the comparison becomes a
literal similarity match instead of an analogy.
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Table 1
Sample Story, in Systematic and Nonsystematic Versions
(Systematic Version Includes Indented Material)
Setting a: There once was a very jealous cat who was
friends with a walrus. The cat often said to the walrus,
"Don't ever play with anyone else but me.
One day the cat went away on a trip and the walrus had no
one to play with. But then a seagull came to visit the walrus.
He brought a wagon along and said, "Would you like to play with
me and my wagon?" The walrus said, "Yes." The seagull and the
walrus had a great time pulling each other around in the
seagull's wagon.
When the cat came back and found the walrus playing with
someone else he got very angry. He shouted, "I'll never play
with you again!"
The cat was so angry that he jumped into the seagull's
wagon. But the wagon began to roll faster down a steep hill.
The cat was very scared.
The seagull jumped up and chased after the wagon so the cat
wouldn't crash. The seagull stopped the runaway wagon and saved
the cat's life.
Moral b: In the end, the cat realized that being jealous
only got him into trouble. It is better to have two friends
instead of one.
a. Setting, Nonsystematic Version: There once was a very strong
cat who was friends with a walrus.
b. Moral is omitted in nonsystematic version.
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Table 2
Characters Used in the Stories, Showing the Three Mapping
Conditions for each Story
Story
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Test
seal
penguin
dog
goose
panda
chimp
hare
beaver
mole
bull
mule
ant
moose
hog
warrior
dragon
horse
snake
hunter
pony
spider
gorilla
steer
alligator
eagle
hippo
tiger
S/S
walrus
seagull
cat
swan
raccoon
monkey
rabbit
bear
porcupine
cow
camel
cricket
elk
pig
medicine man
dinosaur
unicorn
eel
cowboy
zebra
fly
orangutan
buffalo
lizard
vulture
rhino
bobcat
D/S
lion
giraffe
camel
giraffe
camel
lion
camel
giraffe
lion
shark
elephant
I ion
shark
elephant
lion
lion
shark
elephant
ostrich
turtle
giraffe
giraffe
turtle
ostrich
turtle
giraffe
ostrich
S/D
cat
wal rus
seagull
raccoon
monkey
swan
bear
porcupine
rabbit
cricket
cow
camel
medicine man
elk
pig
unicorn
eel
dinosaur
fly
cowboy
zebra
lizard
orangutan
buffalo
bobcat
vulture
rhino
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Partial depiction of the analogy between solar system
and hydrogen atom, showing a person's presumed initial knowledge
of the solar system and the mapping of that knowledge to the
atom.
Figure 2. More detailed depictions of a person's representations
of the solar system.
- a. Systematic representation
- b. Nonsystematic representation
Figure 3. Results: Proportion of statements in the target
stories correctly enacted under different conditions for four-to-
six-year-olds (top graph) and eight-to-ten-year-olds (bottom
graph).
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